53 10 1079 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document A very curious menagerie has been living in Henri IV's castle for a while. A very curious menagerie because of the rare animals living in there, and because it costs such an excessive fortune to the French nation to maintain these animals. The public has examined the fierce animals who were in the cages of the Versailles park. It is possible for the same public to observe some quadrupeds gathered at the Louvre, without going too far. We are going to mention the most remarkable ones. We will indicate their habits, their tendencies, the way they eat, and finally their properties. I—THE ROYAL VETO This animal measures about five feet and five inches. He walks on his back feet, like the humans do. His hairs are fawn. His eyes are like the ones of a beast, his mouth is well cut, and he has a red muzzle and big ears. He does not have much hair. He screams like a pig, and HE DOES NOT HAVE A TAIL. He is naturally voracious. He eats. Rather, he devours in a dirty way everything people throw at him. He is a drunkard and does not stop drinking, from the time he gets up until he goes to bed. The royal veto is as shy as a hare, and as stupid as an ostrich. Finally he represents a big animal nature created with regret. His food costs around twenty-five to thirty millions [livres] a year, and he is not grateful for it. On the contrary, he only tries to harm. His deceitful and rude genius often leads him against the walls of the national terrace, where he sometimes breaks his nose. He is thirty-four or thirty-six years old. He was born in Versailles and he was given the nickname Louis XVI. II—THE ROYAL VETO FEMALE The female of the royal veto is a monster who was found in Vienna, Austria, in the Empress Maria-Theresa's wardrobe. This female monkey with a crown probably had a craving against nature. She probably had sex with a tiger or with a bear and gave birth to Marie Antoinette. This thirty-three-year-old monster was brought to France when the incestuous Louis XV was King. From her country she brought duplicity, and she also added treachery to it, which represents a natural feature of people like her. First she behaved like a very soft person in front of the people. They were screaming: LONG LIVE THE QUEEN! When she was assured she could appear friendly with a few fake smiles, she lifted her mask and was known for what she exactly was. Her marriage to a boor was a political treaty. Her husband was spending all his time making locks and bolts. Like Denis of Syracuse, she soon manages the ways to have fun at the expense of the people. Parc-au-Cerf, Bagatelle, Trianon, Decampativos, and the famous parties were the centers of all attention. During these parties the royal veto was always the chamber pot. The Artois and the Polignac females, the Vaudreuil and the bodyguards, the King and his chipmunk, the Cardinal and Cagliostro, the necklace and the unfortunate Oliva, who was poisoned, represented the main subjects of discussions. The Austrian was being punished for her crimes and the horrors she had committed. But she did not care about it and about the Nation. The people rise up, and the Austrian Siren carries in her arms a child (it is the Prince), and she runs away. Then the Versailles Menagerie is transferred to Paris. . . . The female of the Royal Veto hatches a trip to the frontier with an animal named Lafayette. The chameleon lets the Baronne of Korff go, as well as Louis XVI, King of France and his valet. . . . Then the group is arrested and escorted back to Paris. This is the way Marie Antoinette of Austria takes pleasure in disturbing the peace of a free France. Lately a prostitute was condemned to six months in jail for having insulted a citizen. . . . If Marie Antoinette was being judged the way she deserves it, she would meet good friends at the Salpetrière. The female of the Royal Veto is tall, ugly, wrinkled, used, faded, hideous, awful. As the Nation wrongly promotes its tyrants, she eats the French money in the hope of devouring French people the one after the other. Sortable Date 1789-00-00 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Anonymous, Déscription de la Menagerie Royale d'Animaux Vivants (n.p., n.d.). Description An account of the resource A common theme in libels was to compare the royal family to animals. This pamphlet parodies the Queen and her entourage as animals in a zoo, emphasizing how the courtly way of life at Versailles seemed bizarre to the rest of the French people. (The references to "royal veto" refer to the debate that took place over the power that the King should have under the new constitution to veto laws passed by the Legislative Assembly; by referring to all members of the royal family members, the pamphlet mocks the reduced powers of the crown under the new form of government.) Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 329 Title A name given to the resource Description of the Royal Menagerie (1789) Relation A related resource https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/329/ Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1789 Monarchy Public Opinion Text Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Characters: Louis XVI The Queen The Count of Artois The Duchess of Polignac Bodyguards The action takes place in the apartments. FIRST SCENE Bodyguards Choir, drinking Let's vary our pleasures between Bacchus and the God of the Ton, the example we are shown here, increases our desires. A GUARD To arms, there comes Her Majesty. ANOTHER GUARD There will be an orgy tonight. The female Ganimede is with the Queen. ANOTHER GUARD Artois, the beloved one, there he is between vice and virtue. Guess who the vice is. A GUARD You do not need to guess. I can only see that this God is multiplying. SCENE II The Count of Artois, the Queen, Madame de Polignac THE QUEEN, to Madame de Polignac who steps aside to let the Queen go Come, come in my good friend. THE COUNT OF ARTOIS, slightly pushing the Queen, and pinching her buttocks Come in too (whispering to the Queen) What a nice bottom! So firm! THE QUEEN, whispering to the Count of Artois If my heart was as hard, wouldn't we be good together? THE COUNT OF ARTOIS Be quiet you crazy woman, or else my brother will have another son tonight. THE QUEEN Oh, no! Let's have some pleasure, but no more fruits. THE COUNT OF ARTOIS All right. I will be careful, if I can. THE QUEEN Let's sit down. MADAME DE POLIGNAC Where is the King? THE QUEEN What do you worry about? Soon he will be here to annoy us. Trio: the Queen, the Count of Artois, Madame de Polignac THE QUEEN When I see around me pleasure, love and Graces, fixing me on their tracks, what happiness it is to obey the law. THE COUNT OF ARTOIS, to the Queen O supreme good! I am next to what I love; My heart full of pleasures, Does not have any more desires. MADAME DE POLIGNAC Friendly Princess, what exhilaration it is for me, whenever I can to plunge your senses in the softest drunkenness! Together When I see around me pleasure, love and Graces, fixing me on their tracks, what happiness it is to obey the law. MADAME DE POLIGNAC Here comes the King. Sortable Date 1789-00-00 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Anonymous, L'Autrichienne en Goguettes ou l'Orgie Royale; Opera Proverbe (n.p., n.d. [1789]). Description An account of the resource In 1789, with the collapse of old regime censorship as well as a sense of liberation from traditional moral constraints, printed libels against the Queen became both more common and more intense. An example of this greater intensity is this light opera, with raunchy lyrics set to popular tunes. Not intended to be performed, the pamphlet spoofs the Queen’s great interest in opera and her supposedly even greater interest in the sexual prowess of some of her courtiers. As with the pornographic libels of the old regime, the printed accounts of her trysts with the Count of Artois and the Duchess of Polignac had no basis in fact, but they were consistent with the popularly held view of Marie Antoinette as out of touch with her people, self–interested, and a hindrance to the proper government of France, because of her uncontrollable lusts for power, luxury, and sex. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 328 Title A name given to the resource "The Royal Orgy" (1789) Relation A related resource https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/328/ Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1789 Monarchy Text Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document I doubt not that the King's death will be described in different ways, as the partisan spirit dictates, and that garbled versions of this great event will appear in the newspapers and be noised abroad in such a manner as to distort the truth. As an eyewitness, who has always been far removed from the prejudice of parties, and who is but too well acquainted with the worthlessness of the aura popularis, I am going to give you a faithful account of what happened. I greatly regret that I was obliged to attend the execution bearing arms with the other citizens of the section and I write to you now with my heart filled with grief and my whole being stunned by the shock of this dreadful experience. Louis, who, fortified by the principles of religion, seemed completely resigned to meet death, left his prison in the Temple about nine in the morning and was taken to the place of execution in the mayor's carriage with his confessor and two gendarmes, the curtains being drawn. When he arrived at his destination he looked at the scaffold without flinching. The executioner at once proceeded to perform the customary rite by cutting off the King's hair which he put in his pocket. Louis then walked up onto the scaffold. The air was filled with the roll of numerous drums, seemingly intended to prevent the people from demanding grace. The drumbeats were hushed for a moment by a gesture from Louis himself, but at a signal from the adjutant of the General of the National Guard, they recommenced with such force that Louis's voice was drowned and it was only possible to catch a few stray words like "I forgive my enemies." At the same time he took a few steps round the fatal plank to which he was drawn by a feeling of horror natural to any man on the brink of death or, maybe, he conceived that the people might appeal for grace, for what man does not cling to hope even in his last moments? The adjutant ordered the executioner to do his duty and in a trice Louis was fastened onto the deadly plank of the machine they call the guillotine and his head was cut off so quickly that he could hardly have suffered. This at least is a merit belonging to the murderous instrument which bears the name of the doctor who invented it. The executioner immediately lifted the head from the sack into which it fell automatically and displayed it to the people. As soon as the execution had taken place, the expression on the faces of many spectators changed and, from having worn an air of somber consternation, they shifted to another mood and fell to crying, "Vive la Nation!" At least one can say this of the cavalry who witnessed the execution and who waved their helmets on the point of their sabers. Some of the citizens followed suit, but a great number withdrew, their spirits racked with pain, to shed tears in the bosom of their families. As decapitation could not be performed without spilling blood on the scaffold many persons hurried to the spot to dip the end of their handkerchief or a piece of paper in it, to have a reminder of this memorable event, for one need not have recourse to odious interpretations of such actions. The body was carried to the cemetery of Ste. Marguerite, after the Commissioners of the Municipality, the Security Department and the Criminal Court had drawn up the minutes. His son, the former Dauphin, in an access of childish simplicity, which attracted much sympathy, had in his last conversation with his father urgently begged to be allowed to go with him to the scaffold to ask the people to pardon him. Sortable Date 1793-01-21 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Georges Pernoud and Sabine Flaissier, The French Revolution, translated by Richard Graves (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960), 201–3. Description An account of the resource After voting unanimously to find the King guilty, the deputies held a separate vote on his punishment. By a single vote, Louis was sentenced to death, "within twenty–four hours." Thus, on 21 January 1793, Louis Capet, formerly King of France was beheaded by the guillotine. For the first time in a thousand years, the French people were not ruled by a monarch. The passage below, from a letter by Philippe Pinel, describes the execution—and shows great admiration for Louis’s serenity in the face of a humiliating, public death. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 327 Title A name given to the resource Execution of the King (21 January 1793) Relation A related resource https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/327/ Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January 21, 1793 Monarchy Text The Terror Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Citizens, I remind you of the vital importance of the nation's salvation. On what grounds do you feel obligated to deal with Louis? Punishing a tyrant is not the nation's disgraceful thirst for vengeance, it is the need to consolidate the state's liberty and peace of mind. Any way of judging him, any system of delays that compromises the state's serenity, is in direct opposition to your aims. And it would be better if you had totally forgotten about punishing him, rather than allow his trial to feed the unrest and start a civil war. Each moment we delay allows a new threat to emerge. Every delay stirs guilty hopes and encourages the audacity of the enemies of Liberty. These delays nurture an absolute distrust and terrible suspicions at the heart of this assembly. Citizens, it is the voice of an alarmed nation that urges you to reassure it by hastening your decision. What scruples still shackle your zeal? . . . To try to delay your judgment, you were told about the nation's honor and the dignity of the Assembly. The honor of nations consists of being free and virtuous, of striking down tyrants and avenging the people who have been debased. The glory of the National Convention consists of displaying strength of character and of sacrificing self-serving prejudices in the name of the sublime principles of reason and philosophy. It consists of saving the nation and ensuring liberty by setting an example for all the world. I can see its dignity slipping away as we forget the strength of republican maxims, instead becoming lost in a maze of useless and ridiculous bickering as our speakers in the galleries teach the nation another lesson in monarchy. Posterity will either admire or scorn you by the degree of vigor you demonstrate on this occasion, and that vigor will also be the measure of the daring or the grace which foreign despots will show you. It will be the promise of our servitude or our liberty, our prosperity or our destitution. Citizens, victory will decide if you are rebels or humanity's benefactors, and your strength of character will decide that victory. Citizens, to betray the cause of the people and our own conscience, to hand over the nation to the chaos that the slow pace of such a trial would cause, that is the only danger we have to fear. It is time to break through that deadly obstacle that for so long has stopped us at the very beginning of our path. Then we will march together toward our common goal of public bliss. Then the hateful passions that too often roar in this shrine of liberty will yield to the love of the public good and to the holy emulation of this nation's friends. Then all the plots of the enemies of public order will be confounded. But it is that strange conviction, which at first we could hardly have dared imagine, but which we then suspected, and which was finally openly suggested that shows how far we still are from this goal. For me, it was at that moment that I saw all my fears and suspicions confirmed. At first we seemed troubled by the consequences that a series of delays in the progress of this case might bring. Now we risk rendering it interminable. We feared the unrest that each moment of delay might bring, and here we are, guaranteeing the upheaval of the Republic. What does it matter to us that a dastardly plot is being hidden under a veil of caution, or even under the pretext of respect for the People's sovereignty? Such was the art of all tyrants who disguised themselves under the mask of patriotism, and who have, until now, destroyed liberty and caused of all our problems. These are not artificial rantings, but rather the results that must be weighed. Yes, I say openly that I no longer see the trial of the tyrant as anything other than a means for anarchy to bring us back to despotism. Citizens, I call on you to bear witness. Suppose that from the first moment when the question of judging the last Louis was raised, when the National Convention was convened expressly to judge him, when you left your departments enflamed with the love of liberty, filled with that noble enthusiasm which was inspired by the recent votes of confidence of a magnanimous people and which no foreign influence had changed . . . or even more, suppose that from the very first moment when the question of opening this case arose, someone had said to you: "Do you think that you will be finished with the trial of the tyrant in a week, in two weeks, in three months? You are mistaken. It will not even be you who will pronounce his sentence or who will finally judge him. I propose that you return this case to the twenty or thirty thousand sections that divide France so that they may each give their opinion on this matter. And suppose you adopted this proposal." You would have laughed at the self-confidence of the man who made such a motion. You would have rejected such a motion as incendiary, designed to kindle civil war. Dare I say it? We are assured that the mood has changed. For many among us, this has been due to the influence of a plague-ridden atmosphere, where the simplest and most natural of ideas are often stifled by the most dangerous of sophisms. . . . I admit that today it is no longer a question of absolving Louis for 10 August; the day when monarchy was abolished is still too close. It is a question of adjourning the end of his trial at a time when foreign powers threaten to descend upon us, and to deal with him carefully about the possibility of civil war. Today, we do not want to declare him inviolable, but only make sure that he remains unpunished. It is not a question of returning him to the throne, but rather wait to see what happens. Today, Louis still has the advantage over the defenders of liberty in that they are pursued with more vigor than is he. No one can doubt that greater attention is being paid to slandering the defenders of liberty, and at a greater cost, than in July 1791. And to be sure, the Jacobins were not more disparaged in the Constituent Assembly then than they are now. Then, we were seditious. Today, we are the agitators and the anarchists. Then, Lafayette and his accomplices neglected to have us murdered. We have to hope for the same clemency from his successors. These great friends of peace, these illustrious defenders of the law, have since been declared traitors. But we have gained nothing from that because their old friends, even several members of the then majority, are here to avenge them by persecuting us. But there is something that no one has mentioned and that will nevertheless arouse your curiosity. After a preliminary lampoon which was distributed to all members as usual, the speaker who proposed and elaborated the scheme of taking Louis's case to the court of primary assemblies with such eloquence and feeling, sprinkling his speech with the usual rantings against patriotism, is precisely the same man who, in the Constituent Assembly, lent his voice to the ruling cabal to defend the doctrine of absolute inviolability. It was also he who banished us for having dared to defend the principles of Liberty. . . . In a word, and it must be said, it is the same man who, two days after the massacre on the Champ de Mars, dared to propose a decree which would have established a commission to judge, as quickly as possible and without appeal, the patriots who had escaped the assassins' swords. Since then, I do not know if the ardent friends of Liberty, who are still pressing today for the condemnation of Louis, have become monarchists. But I strongly doubt that the men of whom I speak have changed their principles. It has been well-demonstrated that with only slightly different circumstances, the same passions and vices are driving us, almost irresistibly, toward the same end. Then, plotting gave us an ephemeral and perverted constitution. Today, plotting prevents us from writing a new one, and leads us toward the dissolution of the State. . . . What is sure is that whatever the result of this fatal measure, it has to be to the advantage of their own particular views. To result in civil war, the resolution need not even be totally completed. They are counting on the unrest that this stormy and endless deliberation will stir in us. Those who do not wish to see Louis fall beneath the sword of justice would perhaps not be upset to see him sacrificed to a popular uprising, and will do everything they can to bring it about. . . . Yes, there is no doubt a scheme to bring down the Convention and perhaps to use this interminable affair as an excuse to dissolve it. This scheme is not found among the people who energetically call for the principles of Liberty, nor among those who have sacrificed everything for it. It is not found among the majority of the National Convention who seek goodness and truth. It is not even found among those who are nothing more than the plotters' dupes, and the blind instruments of foreign passions. This scheme exists among twenty or so rascals who hold the reins, who remain silent about this nation's greatest concerns and who, above all, abstain from pronouncing on the question of the last king. It is their silent and pernicious activities which are the cause of all the ills that trouble us, and are readying all the evils that await us. How can we escape this abyss if not by returning to our principles and to the source of our problems? What kind of peace can exist between the oppressor and his oppressed? What kind of harmony can reign where not even the right to vote is respected? Any such violation of freedom is an attack on the nation. A representative of the people does not allow himself to be stripped of the right to defend the interests of the people, and only by taking his life can some force take this right from him. Already, to drag out the dissension and control the deliberations, some conceived the idea of dividing the assembly into majority and minority, a new way to insult and silence those who were designated as the latter. I recognize neither majority nor minority here. The majority is composed of good citizens, and is not permanent since it belongs to no party. It is renewed during every open deliberation since it belongs to the common cause and to eternal reason. And when the Assembly recognizes an error, the fruit of surprise, haste, and intrigue (which occasionally happens), then the minority becomes the majority. The general will is not formed in secret meetings or around ministerial tables. Everywhere and always, the minority has the right to make the voice of truth heard, or what it perceives as such. On this earth, virtue is always in the minority. Without virtue, would the earth not be peopled by tyrants and slaves? Hampden and Sidney were of the minority, for they died on the scaffold. Critiases, Anituses, Caesars, Claudiuses, were all of the majority, but Socrates belonged to the minority, for he swallowed the hemlock. Cato was of the minority, for he ripped out his bowels. I know many men here who, if need be, will serve liberty as Sidney did. . . . This thought alone must send shivers up the spine of the cowardly plotters who wish to mislead or corrupt the majority. Until then, I ask that at least the tyrant take priority. Let us unite to save the nation, and let our deliberations at last assume a character more worthy of us and of the cause which we defend. Let us at least banish the deplorable incidents which do us dishonor. Let us not spend more time in self-persecution than would be needed to judge Louis, and let us learn the source of our problems. Everything seems to conspire against public happiness. The nature of our debates stirs up and embitters public opinion, and that opinion has a terrible effect on us. The mistrust of the representatives seems to grow with the alarm of the citizens. A proposal which we ought to hear with more composure, irritates us. Daily malice exaggerates, imagines, or creates stories designed to strengthen prejudice, and the smallest of causes can lead us to the most terrible of results. The mere expression of the publics' feeling, although sometimes too animated and which should be easy to control, becomes the pretext for the most dangerous measures and for propositions which are the most prejudicial to our principles. People, spare us at least this kind of disgrace. Save your applause for the day when we have passed one law that is of use to humanity. Do you not see that you give them pretexts to slander the sacred cause which we defend? Rather than violate these strict rules, avoid the spectacle of our debates. Remember the ribbon which your hand recently held as an insurmountable barrier around the fatal dwelling of our tyrant, then still on the throne. Remember that order has been maintained thus far without bayonets, by the virtue of the people alone. Far from your view, we will not struggle any less for it. It is now up to us alone to defend your cause. When the last of your defenders has perished, avenge them if you wish, and see to liberty's victory. Citizens, whoever you are, watch over the Temple [where the King is being held]. If necessary; arrest treacherous malice, even patriotism that has been mislead, and confound the plots of our enemies. Fateful place! Was it not enough that the tyrant's despotism weighed so long on this immortal city? Must his very safekeeping be a new calamity for it? Is this trial to be eternal only to perpetuate the means of slandering those people who removed him from the throne? I have proven that the proposal to submit Louis's case to the primary assemblies aimed at civil war. If I am not allowed to help save my country, I would like at least to be acknowledged, at this moment, for the attempts I have made to warn of the calamities that threaten it. I ask that the National Convention declare Louis guilty and deserving of death. Sortable Date 1792-12-28 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived M. J. Mavidal and M. E. Laurent, eds., Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, première série (1787 à 1799), 1st ed., 82 vols. (Paris: 1862–96), 56:17–23. Description An account of the resource As part of his defense, Louis’s lawyers had suggested the King should be judged not by the representatives of the people in the Convention but by the people themselves through a referendum. The Jacobins opposed this idea, fearing it would undermine the Convention’s position as embodying the will of the people. In his second speech of the trial, Robespierre attacks the idea of a referendum as a plot to save the King and thus undermine the Revolution. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 326 Title A name given to the resource Robespierre’s Second Speech (28 December 1792) Relation A related resource https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/326/ Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 28, 1792 Monarchy Text Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Any sensitive man on earth would respect our courage. What people ever made greater sacrifices for liberty! What people was more betrayed! What people less avenged! Let the King himself look into his heart and ask how he has treated this People who today are no more than just, no less than great? Citizens, when first you deliberated the question of this trial, I told you that a king was outside the state, and by nature above the law. This is why whatever covenant may have been agreed upon between the People and the King (in this case an illegitimate covenant), it did not bind him. Nonetheless, you formed a tribunal, and the sovereign stands at the bar with the King who is before you pleading his case and defending himself. You permitted that insult to the dignity of the people. Louis has cast the blame for his crimes on the ministers whom he oppressed and deceived. "Sire," wrote de Morgue to the King on 16 June 1792, "I hereby resign. The particular orders Your Majesty has given me prevent me from executing the laws." On another occasion, de Morgue tries to clear himself from having advised the King to approve the writ against fanatical priests. What sort of prince is it, before whom a minister needs to defend his integrity? And that man is supposed to be inviolable! Such is the circle in which you are placed: you are the judges, Louis the prosecutor, and the People the accused. I do not know where this travesty of the most basic principles of justice will lead you. Had Louis refused your jurisdiction, the trap might not have been sprung. The denial of the sovereignty of the People would have been the final proof of his tyranny. But since the Revolution Louis has tended noticeably less towards open resistance. Supplely, seemingly unrefined and simplistic, he has shown his skill in dividing men. His unflagging policy was to remain motionless or to move in step with all patriots, just as today he seems even to work with his judges in order to make the insurrection appear to be but the rising of a lawless mob. Defenders of the King, what would you require of us? If he is innocent, the nation is guilty. We must finish answering, for the very act of deliberating accuses the People. I have heard talk of an appeal to the People of the verdict which the People itself will pronounce through us. Citizens, if you permit an appeal to the People, you will be saying to them, "the guilt of your murderer is in doubt." Do you not see that such an appeal would tend to divide the People and the legislature, would tend to weaken representation, to restore monarchy, to destroy liberty? And if plotting succeeds in altering your verdict, I ask you gentlemen if you would be left with any option besides renouncing the Republic and returning the tyrant to his throne. There is but a small step from the King's exoneration to his triumph, and from there to the triumph of monarchy. Yet should the accusing people, the ravaged people, the oppressed people, be the judge? Did they not decline that responsibility after the tenth of August? Nobler, more scrupulous, less cruel than those who would send the accused before them, the People wanted a council to decide his fate. That tribunal has already shown too much weakness, and that weakness has already softened public opinion. If the tyrant appeals to his accusers, he does what Charles I never dared. In a functioning monarchy, it is not you who judge the King, for you are nothing by yourselves, but the People judge and speak through you. Today will decide the fate of the Republic. It is doomed if the tyrant goes unpunished. The enemies of the common good will reappear, meet, and hope. The forces of tyranny will pick up their pieces like a reptile renewing its lost tail. All evil men are for the King. Who here then can join him? False pity is on the lips of some, anger on the lips of others. Everything serves to either corrupt us or frighten us down to our souls. Be steadfast in your severity and rest assured of the People's gratitude in time to come. Be more attuned to the true interests of the People than to the empty concerns and empty clamor by which the schemers seek to play upon the respect you have for the rights of the People, the better to destroy those rights and deceive the People. You called for war on all the tyrants of the world, and you would respect your own! Are bloody laws enforced only against the oppressed, and is the oppressor to be spared? . . . We have shown an odd scorn towards the principles and character of this situation. Louis wishes to be King, to speak as King even while denying it. But a man unjustly placed above the law can present the judge only with his innocence or his guilt. Louis can only challenge us by proving his innocence and innocence has no need to challenge its judges for it has nothing to fear. Let Louis explain how the papers you have seen may favor liberty, let him show his wounds, and let us judge the People. Some will say that the Revolution is over, that we have nothing more to fear from the tyrant, and that the law now calls for the death of a usurper. But, citizens, tyranny is like a reed which bends with the wind and which rises again. What do you call a Revolution? The fall of a throne, a few blows levied at a few abuses? Moral order is like physical order: abuses disappear for an instant, just as the morning dew dries, and then just as it falls again with the night, so the abuses reappear. The Revolution begins when the tyrant ends. I have attempted to show the conduct of the King. It is now for you to be just. You must put aside all considerations but those of justice and the common good. Above all, you must not compromise your liberty which was acquired at so high a price. You must pronounce a verdict which allows for no appeal. If you do not, the greatest of criminals, and a King, will have been the first to enjoy a right refused to citizens, and the tyrant will once again be above the law, even after his trial. Nor should you permit the verdict to be challenged, for it reflects the wishes and opinions of all. If those who spoke of the King are challenged, we will challenge, in the name of France, those who said nothing for our country or those who deceived it. France is amongst us; let each man choose between her and the King, between the exercise of justice by the People and the exercise of your own weaknesses. Weigh, if you will, the example which you owe the world, the impetus you owe liberty and the unflagging justice you owe the People, against criminal pity for one who never felt such a sentiment. Say to Europe as it bears witness: Unite your kings against us for we have rebelled against kings. Have the courage to speak the truth, for it seems to me that there are those here who fear sincerity. Truth burns silently in all hearts, like a lamp burning over a tomb. Yet if there be someone among you unconcerned by the fate of the Republic, let him fall at the feet of the tyrant, let him return the knife with which he slaughtered your fellow citizens, let him forget all crimes of the King and tell the people that we have been corrupted, and that we have been less interested in their well-being than in the fate of an assassin. Sortable Date 1792-12-27 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived M. J. Mavidal and M. E. Laurent, eds., Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, première série (1787 à 1799), 2d ed., 82 vols. (Paris: Dupont, 1879–1913), 53–56:706–10. Description An account of the resource By late December, the Convention was in the process of trying the King. Louis agreed to testify in his own defense. He justified the decisions of 1789–91 by pointing out that he had still been King and that he had consistently tried to rule within the parameters of the constitution. The next day, Saint–Just spoke for the second time, reproaching the deputies for allowing the proceedings to drag on during the war crisis. Finally he urged them to act decisively for liberty and against tyranny by condemning Louis. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 325 Title A name given to the resource Saint–Just’s Speech on the King’s Fate (27 December 1792) Relation A related resource https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/325/ Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 27, 1792 Monarchy Text Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Citizens, without realizing it the Assembly has been lead far from the true question. There is no trial to be conducted here. Louis is not accused and you are not judges. You are, as you can only be, the nation's statesmen and representatives. No verdict is required, either for or against a man. Rather, a step aimed at the public safety needs to be taken, an act of salvation for the nation. In a Republic a deposed king is good for only one of two things: He either disrupts the peace of the state and weakens its freedom, or he strengthens both simultaneously. I assert that the nature of the deliberations to date are directly at odds with this latter goal. In fact, what rational course of action is called for to solidify a newborn Republic? Is it not to etch an eternal contempt for royalty into everyone's soul and mute the King's supporters? . . . Louis was the King, and the Republic is established. The vital question that occupies you here is resolved by these few words: Louis has been deposed by his crimes. He denounced the French people as rebels, and to punish them he called upon the arms of his fellow tyrants. Victory and the people have decided that he alone was the rebel. Consequently, Louis cannot be judged. Either he is already condemned, or else the Republic is not absolved. To suggest that Louis XVI be tried in any way whatsoever is to regress toward royal and constitutional despotism. A proposal such as this, since it would question the legitimacy of the Revolution itself, is counterrevolutionary. In actuality, if Louis can still be brought to trial, he might yet be acquitted. In truth, he is presumed innocent until he has been found guilty. If Louis is acquitted, what then becomes of the Revolution? If Louis is innocent, all defenders of liberty are then slanderers. . . . Citizens, defend yourselves against [tyranny]! False ideas have deceived you. . . . You are confusing the state of a people in the midst of a revolution with the state of a people whose government is firmly established. You are confusing a nation that punishes a public official while maintaining its form of government with a nation that destroys the government itself. . . . When a nation has been forced to resort to its right of insurrection, its relationship with the tyrant is then determined by the law of nature. By what right does the tyrant invoke the social contract? He abolished it! The nation, if it deems proper, may preserve the contract insofar as it concerns the relations between citizens. But the end result of tyranny and insurrection is to completely break all ties with the tyrant and to reestablish the state of war between the tyrant and the people. Tribunals and judiciary procedure are designed only for citizens. . . . Insurrection is the real trial of a tyrant. His sentence is the end of his power, and his sentence is whatever the People's liberty requires. The trial of Louis XVI? What is this trial if not an appeal from the insurrection to some tribunal or assembly? When the people have dethroned a king, who has the right to revive him, thereby creating a new pretext for riot and rebellionÑand what else could result from such actions? By giving a platform to those championing Louis XVI, you rekindle the dispute between despotism and liberty and sanction blasphemy of the Republic and the people . . . for the right to defend the former despot includes the right to say anything that sustains his cause. You reawaken all the factions, reviving and encouraging a dormant royalism. One could easily take a position for or against. What could be more legitimate or more natural than to everywhere spread the maxims that his defenders could openly profess in the courtroom, and within your very forum? What manner of Republic is it whose founders solicit its adversaries from all quarters to attack it in its cradle? . . . Representatives, what is important to the people, what is important to yourselves, is that you fulfill the duties with which the people have entrusted you. The Republic has been proclaimed, but have you delivered it to us. You have yet to pass a single law deserving of that title. You have yet to reform a single abuse of despotism. Remove but the name and we have tyranny still, with even more vile factions and even more immoral charlatans, while there is new tumultuous unrest and civil war. The Republic! And Louis still lives! And you continue to place the King between us and liberty! Our scruples risk turning us into criminals. Our indulgence for the guilty risks our joining him in his guilt. . . . Regretfully I speak this fatal truthÑLouis must die because the nation must live. Among a peaceful people, free and respected both within their country and from without, it would be possible to listen to the counsel of generosity which you have received. But a people that is still fighting for its freedom after so much sacrifice and so many battles; a people for whom the laws are not yet irrevocable except for the needy; a people for whom tyranny is still a crime subject to disputeÑsuch a people should want to be avenged. The generosity which you are encouraged to show would more closely resemble that of a gang of brigands dividing their spoils. I propose that you take immediate legal action on the fate of Louis XVI. . . . I ask that the National Convention state that from this moment on he is a traitor to the French nation and a criminal against humanity. I ask that for these reasons, that in the very place where the martyrs of liberty gave their lives on the tenth of August, he be made an example for the world. And I ask that this memorable event be consecrated by a monument that will nurture in the hearts of all people a sense of their own rights and a horror of tyrants, as well as nurture in any tyrant's soul the salutary terror of the people's justice. Sortable Date 1792-12-03 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived M. J. Mavidal and M. E. Laurent, eds., Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, première série (1787 à 1799), 2d ed., 82 vols. (Paris: Dupont, 18791913), 5356:32426. Description An account of the resource Maximillien Robespierre, a leading Jacobin deputy in the Convention, had originally opposed the trial, believing that to try the King was to imply the possibility of his innocence. Nevertheless, once it was under way, Robespierre took the lead in arguing that on trial was not "the man Louis Capet" but the institution of the monarchy . He argued that since the Revolution essentially concerned the sovereignty of the people, a Revolution could not coexist with a king, and thus, he reached his famous conclusion that Louis must die, so that the Revolution could live. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 324 Title A name given to the resource Robespierre (3 December 1792) Relation A related resource https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/324/ Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 3, 1792 Monarchy Text Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document The crimes of Louis XVI are unhappily all too real; they are consistent; they are notorious. Do we even have to ask the question of whether a nation has the right to judge, and execute, its highest ranking public official . . . when, to more securely plot against the nation, he concealed himself behind a mask of hypocrisy? Or when, instead of using the authority confided to him to protect his countrymen, he used it to oppress them? Or when he turned the laws into an instrument of violence to crush the supporters of the Revolution? Or when he robbed the citizens of their gold in order to subsidize their foes, and robbed them of their subsistence in order to feed the barbarian hordes who came to slaughter them? Or when he created monopolies in order to create famine by drying up the sources of abundance so that the people might die in misery and hunger? Or when he declared himself the leader of the traitors and conspirators, and when he turned against the nation those arms he had received to defend it? Or when he hatched the plot to have the defenders of liberty slaughtered, and enchain the people once again? To even ask this question is an insult to reason, an outrage to justice, a perversion of nature. To doubt if a despot sullied with all possible crimes, or if a monster still covered with the blood of those friends of France whose slaughter he had commanded, can be brought to judgment and executed? To doubt this is to mock humanity and to abandon all sense of shame. . . . The committee on legislation has made clear, by a series of arguments drawn from natural law, from the law of nations, and from civil law, that Louis Capet should be brought to judgment. That step was necessary to instruct the people; for it is important that all members of the Republic be brought to this conviction by those different routes that are suitable to their different spirits. The representatives of the sovereign people can only see the question though the lens of politics. Among the speakers who preceded me to this rostrum, those who saw the question from this point of view, referring to the supposed initial contract and arguing for the reciprocity of the conditions stipulated between people and prince, have inferred from this fact that Louis Capet, having broken his contract by his crimes, has fallen from the throne and can be considered only as a simple citizen. This is an erroneous conclusion, laboriously deduced from a futile sophism—because there was never a contract between the people and their agents, although there was a binding one between the sovereign and its members. A nation which delegates its powers to representatives does not contract with them, it assigns them various duties in the general interest. The representatives may very well, on occasion, refuse these duties, yet they always remain accountable to the nation which can withdraw these duties at any time and without the representatives' consent. Thus, regardless of whatever pomp may be associated with these duties, they should never be considered as anything but an honorable duty. Gentlemen, such are the true bonds which exist between the sovereign and his representatives. The original contract which has been cited as the basis for these bonds is completely imaginary. If such a contract exists, it is only among conquering nations; and even then, it can have no effect except when the head of the army has become the head of state and has found a means to inspire fear, or when he is in open war with a nation he has forced to surrender. What! Shall we turn away from the crimes of a usurper in order to establish his prerogatives, and shall we accept the usurpation of sovereignty by our highest representative as a legitimate and sacred right? Nonetheless, such is the odious contract which existed between the French and their princes: an iniquitous contract which the representatives of the French people renewed with Louis Capet, heir to the power usurped by his ancestors, after his excessive squandering had forced him to assemble the Estates-General in order to fill the abyss which he had dug. And after his last attacks that caused the nation to rise against the tyranny, he was forced to humble himself and ask for mercy. Such a contract is totally null and void, not only because it offends the most beloved interests and most sacred rights of the people, but because the people have not ratified it. . . . The constitution states that the person of the King is inviolable and sacred. But that inviolability, which the legislators were careful to avoid defining clearly and which is invoked today for the benefit of Louis the traitor as a certificate of impunity, applied only to the legal acts of the monarch. It was therefore merely the privilege not to be called to account for the choice of means by which the laws were executed. As such, inviolability was only aimed at smoothing the workings of the political process by preventing constant hindrance to him who was supposed to give it movement and life. . . . If the Constitution was completed and liberty consolidated, if the wounds of the state were healed, if peace reigned among us, if abundance, flowing through its various channels, had once again begun to bring life to the Empire, if the nation could rest at last in the shadow of wise laws and look forward to happy times . . . perhaps then the scourge of the monarchy would be nothing more than a painful memory. Perhaps then we might be able to abandon the tyrant to his regrets, to the long punishment of life for the ills he has done us, or rather, for the liberty which followed his attacks. But, gentlemen, if you were ever able to lend an ear to the sophisms of those who wish to spare his life while yet subjecting him to the rule of law, concern for the public safety alone should force you to reject any penalty short of death. For as long as the former monarch draws breath and an unforeseen event may free him, he will be the center of all the conspiracies of France's enemies. And if his prison does not become the home of their endless plots, it will become their rallying point. Consequently, unless the tyrant loses his head, there will be no liberty, no security, no peace, no rest, no happiness for the French, and no hope for other peoples of breaking their yokes. Must I speak to you of the bloody scenes, the disasters, the dissolution of the state, the slaughter of all the friends of liberty, of your own suffering, which would be the result of his dreadful vengeance if he were ever to escape and place himself at the head of enemy armies who even now ready themselves to return against us? What pen could describe them, what heart so hard that it could bear the thought? Gentlemen, Louis Capet was not alone in plotting the nation's ruin. Once on trial, he will denounce his accomplices, his ministers, his agents, the people's disloyal deputies, the administrators, the judges, and the generals who conspired with him against public safety. The preparation of his case is therefore the surest means to finally deliver the nation from its most formidable enemies, to strike fear into the traitors, to cut off their plots at the root, and finally, to assure liberty, peace, and public bliss. Without these, your efforts to reestablish order and prepare for the reign of law will be in vain. "The former monarch must be judged; that is beyond doubt; but by whom shall he be judged?" I would reply: by an ordinary state tribunal, composed of the people's direct delegates—if one could confide so important a case to an ordinary tribunal and if a prompt decision were not so important for the public safety. Let there be no more doubt: Louis Capet is still the rallying point for the enemies of liberty, just as he is the source of their hopes. Therefore, he can only be judged by the National Convention which represents the nation itself. Let no one object, in order to invoke for the accused the title of born-representative of the people, that this convention will not have jurisdiction; it is a false and misleading title conferred upon him by baseness, shrewdness, and treachery in order to raise him above the law. The monarch was merely the highest public official, and for that title he can claim no prerogative. A final question remains to be examined. How should the former monarch be judged? With pomp and with severity. We are far from those mistaken ideas of clemency and generosity by which the national vanity is flattered! How could they listen to us without laying upon us the blame of the nation and all the ills which would befall the land if we left the former monarch the possibility of plotting again? To grant a pardon would therefore not be merely weakness, but treason, villainy, and treachery. Gentlemen, France's safety and the establishment of the Republic depends on the course you choose. I conclude that the tyrant be judged by the Convention and that his punishment be death. Sortable Date 1792-12-03 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived M. J. Mavidal and M. E. Laurent, eds., Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, première série (1787 à 1799), 2d ed., 82 vols. (Paris: Dupont, 1879–1913), 53–56:246–49. Description An account of the resource As a journalist, Marat had for the first few years of the Revolution supported the monarchy as an institution. Yet he opposed Louis personally; in this text, published in his newspaper, Journal of the Republic (but not delivered before the Convention), he argued for a trial of "Louis Capet," as a man not the King. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 323 Title A name given to the resource Marat (3 December 1792) Relation A related resource https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/323/ Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 3, 1792 Monarchy Text Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document In the case where an entire nation has been wronged and is both prosecutor and judge, it is the opinion of mankind, the opinion of posterity, to which that nation is accountable. It must be able to state that all the general principles of jurisprudence that are recognized by enlightened men everywhere have been respected. It must be able to stand up to the blindest of biases so that not even the smallest rule of equity can be cited as having been violated. Then, when that nation judges a king, kings themselves, in their inmost hearts, must approve of the judgment.It is important for the happiness of mankind that the conduct of France towards the man it too long called its king be the final step in curing other nations of whatever superstitions they may still hold which favor a monarchy. Above all, we should beware lest we increase that superstition among those still ruled by a monarch. . . . Thus, it is to the laws of universal justice, common to all constitutions and unalterable in the midst of clashing opinions and the revolutions of empires, that we must subject our decisions.Can the former King be judged?An action can be grounds for legitimate punishment only if a previous law specifically identified that action as a crime; and it can be punished only with a penalty which likewise was prescribed by a previous law. . . .If, however, the law failed to distinguish in the list of crimes those which aggravating circumstances made even more heinous, it must not be concluded that the law wished to exempt them from punishment, but only that the aggravating circumstances did not seem to require the prescription of a specific penalty. The laws of Solon do not include parricide. Shall we conclude then that the monster who was guilty of this crime was intended to remain unpunished? No, surely he should receive the same punishment as a murderer.If, then, the laws of France say nothing specifically about a king who conspired against the people, even though he is much more guilty than a citizen, it does not follow that he should be spared, but only that those who wrote the laws did not wish to distinguish him from other conspirators. He should be judged then by the usual law, if another law did not specifically exclude him. . . .Two articles make this clear. In one, the person of the King is declared inviolable and sacred. The other states that for all crimes committed after his legal abdication, he shall be judged like other citizens. . . .The person of the King was declared sacred. Either 'sacred' has no meaning, or it has the sense which it is given in the tenets of the various religions. In the case of unjust acts of violence, this is a crime against religion in addition to a crime against society. In legal convictions, the guilty man is stripped of his civil rights before being sentenced so as to inspire a greater respect for what is somewhat supernatural in nature. By this, the constitutional King was likened to a bishop or a priest, persons also considered sacred but who are nevertheless not exempt from the power of the laws.The authors of the Constitution, by instituting a monarchy, created a power outside of nature which they believed required superstitious terrors in order to provide for the security of kings. But the result is merely that if the monarchy had not been abolished, the forfeiture of rights would have had to be decreed in a separate judgment.The word 'inviolable' is not defined by the Constitution as it applies to the King; but it is defined elsewhere, as it applies to the representatives of the people.Their inviolability entails two very distinct conditions, both applicable to the King. The first is that they may not be persecuted for what they did or said as representatives; and as soon as a king was established he must necessarily share in this kind of inviolability.This prerogative, extended to all the King's executive acts, posed dangers which that of the deputies did not. Thus the King was required to have these acts validated by the signature of a minister responsible for their legitimacy. The nation was not without checks, and if it did not have all those which might be demanded by the principles of justice rigorously applied, at least it had all those compatible with the existence of so bizarre an institution as the monarchy. . . .. . . But it is common knowledge that he is accused of crimes outside of his royal duties. It was not as King that he paid for parodies designed to ruin the nation's credibility, or that he bribed France's enemies, or that, in concert with his brothers, he formed a league with the enemies of the nation. It was not as King that, in despite of the laws that he himself had approved, he armed foreign troops against the citizens of France.Another condition of the inviolability of the popularly elected representatives was that they could not be prosecuted except by decree of the legislature. Thus when the Constituent Assembly discussed the question of the King's inviolability this point was rightfully mentioned, for by the very nature and importance of his functions he could not be answerable before a tribunal on the summons of those public officials whose conduct he supervised. It was shown that the man who had the authority to suspend the creation of laws, the head of the executive and commander of the army and the navy, should not be exposed to the risk of being stopped from these great tasks by the will of any particular tribunal. The arguments used to exempt the deputies from the common order of judicial prosecutions were used in the king's favor, and with the same success. . . .Thus, the impunity of the King was not decreed by the Constitution. Yet that document did not set forth the way in which he was to be judged. It did state that if he ceased to be King, he would, for his subsequent crimes, be prosecuted and judged like any other citizen; but it did not decide as to how he might be judged or prosecuted for his prior crimes. . . .Moreover, how could the Constituent Assembly have set down in the Constitution the method by which the King was to be judged? In accordance with the spirit of the Constitution, the legislature could not have the power to accuse him. To whom could that power belong? To the nation alone, and from there to the representatives which it named to the Convention. It would therefore have been necessary for the Constitution to indicate to the National Assemblies precisely the same plan of conduct that the Assembly of 1792 followed on 10 August. And if one recalls the timid circumspection with which the Constituent Assembly spoke of the inalienable right of the people to change its constitutional laws, one will not be astonished to see that the Assembly has not dared facilitate the exercise of this power by placing in the Constitution a means by which, in the case of serious accusations brought against the King by the citizens, the legislature might call a National Convention. . . .It is time to teach kings that the silence of the laws about their crimes is the ill consequence of their power, and not the will of reason or equity.The question, then, has been reduced to an examination of whether the rule of justice, which requires that a prior law determine the offense and the punishment, does not also require a preexisting law in order to establish the procedure of judgment.Now I do not believe that justice demands this. . . .Let me return to the subject of this discussion. Is the existence of Louis XVI favorable or adverse to sincere or feigned supporters, to foreigners or Frenchmen, to constitutional or hereditary monarchy? Does it benefit their plans that the throne which they wish to reinstate may be occupied by a child or must necessarily be occupied by a man made vile by his conduct and odious by his crimes? Is it in the interest of the French Republic to diminish the interval which separates persons living in foreign lands from the throne, lands where they will long be the active and docile instruments of all our enemies?In a word, as the existence of these hereditary pretenders is a necessary evil, can the conservation of our liberty be truly influenced by changes in the order of the claims, in the interest, hopes, and means of the persons called to take part in this absurd substitution?Will our severity frighten or irritate the enemy kings and the devotees of monarchy? Will the still-wavering sentiments of several nations be alienated or encouraged? These are questions to which it is difficult to reply without having been able to observe the effects of our first resolution on France and on Europe. Such questions seem to demand that the National Convention reserve the right to modify the sentence of the tribunal, or to submit it to the people and tell them how to execute it.If the judgment were favorable, would the nation have lost all rights over the man who had been King? Let us suppose that in the exercise of his usurped authority, a hereditary and absolute monarch had committed no injustices, no violent acts. Let us suppose that, blinded by his education, he honestly believed that his authority was legitimate. Let us admit that these are two hypotheses which no king has ever realized. Can it not be said then that the involuntary nature of the error absolves the penalty? But the right to be cautious concerning the effects of this error nonetheless remains. One does not punish a madman, but one takes the steps necessary to assure that he can cause no harm. And if the liberty of Louis XVI, innocent, were dangerous for the safety of the nation, doubtless the nation would retain the right to deprive him of that liberty.Yet how could we, in all fairness, reserve the right to take precautions for our safety in the case of an acquittal, without at the same time reserving for ourselves the right to modify the penalty in the case of a conviction?Thus, by giving political considerations all the weight which they might be expected to have, we see that they are unrelated to the question of the judgement, and that they could only influence the commutation of the pronounced penalty or the precautions which might be required by the nation's interest. To judge an accused king is a duty; to pardon him can be an act of prudence; to retain the possibility of such a course is an act of wisdom for those to whom the political destiny of a nation has been confided.I would therefore propose a postponement of the question of whether and by whom the judgment may be modified until the other questions have been decided, and just before the tribunal is seated.Such are my reflections on a subject that belongs to the order of human things, which philosophy may treat, for once, according to the principles of justice and with a sense of cool impartiality.Kings have long been mere men in the eyes of reason; and the time approaches when they will be so for politics as well. Yet at this moment, when the prejudices which surround a throne have disappeared at last but the influence of kings on the destiny of nations still remains, is it only now that it is possible and useful to expand the people's rights of over these beings beset by error and vileness, and over the ghosts of their superstitions.When Europe has but one king to judge, then his trial, having become an ordinary case, will no longer deserve the world's attention. Sortable Date 1792-12-03 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived M. J. Mavidal and M. E. Laurent, eds., Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, première série (1787 à 1799), 2d ed., 82 vols. (Paris: Dupont, 1879Ð1913), 53Ð56:146Ð53. Description An account of the resource Jean–Antoine Nicolas Condorcet, formerly a marquis, circulated a pamphlet that was a Girondin response to Saint–Just. Although he too endorsed a trial of the King, he emphasized the necessity of following constitutional procedures, meaning that any trial had to be held in accordance with the constitution and proper legal forms. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 322 Title A name given to the resource Condorcet (3 December 1792) Relation A related resource https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/322/ Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 3, 1792 Monarchy Text Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document I think it necessary that Louis XVI should be tried; not that this advice is suggested by a spirit of vengeance, but because this measure appears to me just, lawful, and conformable to sound policy. If Louis is innocent, let us put him to prove his innocence; if he is guilty, let the national will determine whether he shall be pardoned or punished. . . . Louis XVI, considered as an individual, is an object beneath the notice of the Republic; but when he is looked upon as a part of that band of conspirators, as an accused man whose trial may lead all nations in the world to know and detest the disastrous system of monarchy and the plots and intrigues of their own courts, he ought to be tried. If the crimes for which Louis XVI is arraigned were absolutely personal to him, without reference to general conspiracies and confined to the affairs of France, the plea of inviolability, that folly of the moment, might have been urged in his behalf with some appearance of reason; but he is arraigned not only for treasons against France, but for having conspired against all Europe, and if France is to be just to all Europe we ought to use every means in our power to discover the whole extent of that conspiracy. France is now a republic; she has completed her revolution; but she cannot earn all its advantages so long as she is surrounded with despotic governments. Their armies and their marine oblige her also to keep troops and ships in readiness. It is therefore her immediate interest that all nations shall be as free as herself; that revolutions shall be universal; and since the trial of Louis XVI can serve to prove to the world the flagitiousness of governments in general, and the necessity of revolutions, she ought not to let slip so precious an opportunity. The despots of Europe have formed alliances to preserve their respective authority and to perpetuate the oppression of peoples. This is the end they proposed to themselves in their invasion of French territory. They dread the effect of the French Revolution in the bosom of their own countries; and in hopes of preventing it, they are come to attempt the destruction of this revolution before it should attain its perfect maturity. Their attempt has not been attended with success. France has already vanquished their armies; but it remains for her to sound the particulars of the conspiracy, to discover, to expose to the eyes of the world, those despots who had the infamy to take part in it; and the world expects from her that act of justice. As to "inviolability," I would not have such a word mentioned. If, seeing in Louis XVI only a weak and narrow-minded man, badly reared, like all his kind, given, as it is said, to frequent excesses of drunkenness a man whom the National Assembly imprudently raised again on a throne for which he was not made—he is shown hereafter some compassion, it shall be the result of the national magnanimity, and not the burlesque notion of a pretended "inviolability." Sortable Date 1792-11-21 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Source: Moncure Daniel Conway, ed., The Writings of Thomas Paine, vol 3 (New York: AMS Press, 1967) 115–118. Description An account of the resource An Englishman acclaimed as a hero of the American Revolution, Thomas Paine had been elected to the Convention by radicals in Paris. However, his international perspective and Anglo–American background (including a Quaker upbringing) inclined him temperamentally to ally with the Girondins, who were less radically republican and who looked more favorably upon the King as an individual and an institution, and who not coincidentally often spoke some English. His speech was written in English and it was read to the Convention (in French) the day after the discovery of the letters in the King’s "locked chest." Accordingly, it called for a full investigation and trial of the King, based on his policies rather than his person. Nonetheless, compassion for the individual remained a possibility. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 321 Title A name given to the resource Paine (21 November 1792) Relation A related resource https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/321/ Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource November 21, 1792 Monarchy Text Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document I shall undertake, citizens, to prove that the King can be judged. . . . I say that the King should be judged as an enemy and that even more than judge him, we must fight him. Also, in that he was not a party to the contract that unites all French people, the judicial procedure to follow is not to be found in Civil Law, but rather in Common Law. . . . Perhaps one day, men as far removed from our prejudices as we are from those of the Vandals will be astonished by the barbarity of an age in which the judging of a tyrant was thought to be something sacred. Where the people, having a tyrant to judge, raised him to the rank of citizen before investigating his crimes and were more concerned about what would be said about them than about the task at hand. And where a guilty man who belonged to the class of oppressors, the lowest class of humanity, became a martyr to their pride. One day men will be astonished by the fact that humanity in the eighteenth century was less advanced than in the time of Caesar. Then a tyrant was slain in the midst of the Senate with no formalities but thirty blows of a dagger and with no other law save the liberty of Rome. And today we respectfully conduct a trial for a man who assassinated a people, caught in flagrante delicto, his murderous hands soaked with blood! These same men who are to judge Louis also have a Republic to create. Those who attach any importance to the King receiving a fair punishment will never be able to create a Republic. For us, the sensitivity of our minds and character is a great obstacle to liberty. We make all error seem more attractive and, more often than not, truth for us is only the seduction of our tastes. . . . We must therefore courageously advance toward our goal, and if we desire a Republic, we must be serious about it. We judge ourselves severely, I would even say with rage. We think only of tempering the energy of the People and of liberty, whereas we hardly reproach our common enemy. And everyone, either from weakness or because they stand with the accused, look at each other before striking the first blow. We seek liberty, and we are becoming each other's slaves! We seek nature, and live armed, like wild savages. We desire a Republic, independence, and unity, but we are divided and treat a tyrant with gentleness . . . . It would seem that we are searching for a law that would allow us to punish the King. . . . The social contract is between citizens, not between citizens and government. A contract is useless against those who are not bound by it. Consequently, Louis, who was a party to it, cannot be judged by Civil Law. The contract was so oppressive that it bound the People, but not the King. Such a contract was necessarily void since nothing is legitimate that is not sanctioned by ethics and nature. These reasons lead you all not to judge Louis as a citizen, but as a rebel. But besides these reasons, by what right does he demand to be judged by Civil Law, which is our obligation toward him, when it is clear that he himself betrayed the only obligation that he had undertaken towards us, that of our protection ? Is this not the last act of a tyrant, to demand to be judged by the laws that he destroyed? And Citizens, if we were to grant him a civil trial, in conformance with the laws and as a citizen, it would be him who would be trying us. He would be trying the People themselves. For myself, I can see no middle ground. This man must reign or die. He will prove to you that all he has done, he has done to uphold his office with which he had been entrusted. By discussing this with him, you cannot make him incriminate himself for his hidden malice. He will lead you in a vicious circle created by your very accusations. . . . I will say more: a constitution accepted by a King did not bind the citizens. They had, even before his crime, the right to banish him and send him into exile. To judge a King as a citizen . . . that would astound a dispassionate posterity. To judge is to apply the law. A law is linked to justice, and common to mankind and kings? What does Louis have in common with the French people that they should treat him well after he betrayed them? . . . It is impossible to reign in innocence. The folly of that is all too evident. All Kings are rebels and usurpers. Do Kings themselves treat otherwise those who seek to usurp their authority? Was not Cromwell's memory brought to trial? And certainly Cromwell was no more usurper than Charles I. For when a people is so weak as to yield to the tyrant's yoke, domination is the right of the first comer, and it is no more sacred or legitimate for one than for another. These are the considerations that a generous and republican people must not forget when judging a King. You will be told that the verdict is to be ratified by the People. If that is to be, why can they themselves not pass judgment? If we did not sense the weakness of such ideas, whatever form of government we might adopt would find us slaves. The sovereign would never be in his place, nor the magistrate in his, and the people would have no guarantee against oppression. Citizens, the tribunal which must judge Louis is not a judiciary tribunal . . . it is a council . . . it is the People . . . it is you. And the laws that must guide us are those of citizens' rights. A civil trial would be unjust since the King, deemed to be a citizen, cannot be judged by the same men who have accused him. Louis is a foreigner among us. He was not a citizen before his crime: he could not vote, he could not bear arms. He is even less a citizen since his crime, and by what abuse of justice would you make him a citizen in order to condemn him? As soon as a man is found guilty, he leaves the polity, but quite to contrary, Louis would gain entry by his crime. I would go even farther . . . if you declare the King to be a citizen, he will slip from your grasp. Which of his obligations would you rely on in the current state of things? . . . I shall forever contend that the spirit in which the King will be judged is the same spirit with which the Republic will be established. The theory behind your verdict will be that of your public offices, and the measure of your philosophy in the verdict, will be the measure of your liberty in the constitution. . . . You will never see my personal will oppose the general will. I shall desire what the People of France, or the majority of its representatives, desire. But, as my personal will concerns a portion of the law which has not yet been written, I open myself to you in all frankness . . . . It is therefore you who must decide if Louis is the enemy of the French people, if he is an alien. If the majority of you decide to absolve him, then that verdict would have to be ratified by the People, for if no act of the sovereign can truly constrain a single citizen to pardon a King, even less could an act of the magistracy constrain the sovereign! . . . Sortable Date 1792-11-13 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived M. J. Mavidal and M. E. Laurent, eds., Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, première série (1787 à 1799), 2d ed., 82 vols. (Paris: Dupont, 1879–1913), 53–56:390–93. Description An account of the resource The first debate over the fate of Louis XVI concerned whether the Convention could try the King at all, and if so, for what crimes. The Constitution of 1791 had promised Louis "inviolability," meaning immunity from prosecution. One of the first speakers was Louis–Antoine Léon de Saint–Just, a brilliant, idealistic, and young Jacobin deputy. He drew on Montesquieu as well as Rousseau to argue that the legislature indeed had both the political authority under the constitution and the moral justification to judge the King. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 320 Title A name given to the resource Saint–Just (13 November 1792) Relation A related resource https://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/320/ Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource November 13, 1792 Monarchy Text